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Dionysus and Divine Violence: a reading of The Bacchae 
 
 
The subject is lifeless except when it is 
able to shudder in response to the total 
spell. And only the subject’s shudder can 
transcend that spell. 
- T.W. Adorno1 
 
 
When Agave appears towards the end of The Bacchae with the head of her 
son, Pentheus, on a stick – a thyrsus – calling everyone to join the feast, she is 
enacting a number of taboos for the Greeks and their tragic stage: infanticide, 
cannibalism, human sacrifice and regicide. And in standing on the stage, convulsing 
in ecstasy and pleasure – a pleasure that will soon turn into repulsion – she is in many 
ways also exposing the limits or possibilities of the tragic experience itself. For 
despite her call, a call aimed as much at the citizens of Thebes as at the audience, the 
theatrical event does not dissolve or erupt into an orgy of emotion and sensation – a 
Platonic nightmare or a ‘parody of catharsis’,2 as Adorno defines kitsch. Indeed, as 
this analysis hopes to show, Agave’s flaunting of her prey and her subsequent 
recognition – anagnorisis -of this as the face of her son, acts as a kind of gestus, in the 
Brechtian sense, of the ways in which tragedy could be seen to negotiate notions of 
affect, spectatorship and catharsis. And in doing so, this play, probably more than any 
other Greek play, helps to create an aesthetic of cruelty for the stage. 
This paper proposes to revisit the play in an attempt to trace a kind of 
aesthetics of cruelty that I think has been shaped by this play and its reception. For 
this is the play that has helped create a theatricality of cruelty that in its Christian 
manifestations, for example, allows us to read the passion of Christ as a tragedy or in 
its modernist renditions conceptualises Dionysus as negativity, both for modernist 
theatre and for the philosophers of modernity from Nietzsche onwards. 
 2 
It is true that many of the themes and tropes that form the reception of The 
Bacchae, were thought through, particularly from the eighteenth century onwards, 
within the context of the so-called ‘German cast’ of Greek tragedy. This is the 
philosophical tradition that initiates a spilt between tragedy as a literary form - a 
poetics, in the legacy of Aristotle – and tragedy as a philosophical category as 
something that pertains to life in general; an ‘idea of the tragic’. In the words of Peter 
Szondi: ‘Since Aristotle we have a poetics of tragedy, only since Schelling a 
philosophy of the tragic’.3 However, this opposition is problematised by Stephen 
Halliwell, who claims that the Greeks did indeed have a philosophy of tragedy and 
that this can be seen not in the great advocate of tragedy and its cathartic / redemptive 
function, Aristotle, but in the philosopher he was defending tragedy against, Plato. 
Halliwell writes: 
 
One commonly drawn corollary of the German cast of interest in the tragic is 
the claim that while ancient Greece created the first and most concentrated 
tradition of dramatic tragedy, it lacked anything that can be classified as an 
explicit notion of the tragic. But I contend… that there are important grounds 
for ascribing to Plato the first conscious delineation of something we can 
coherently identify as ‘the tragic’.4 
 
It is fascinating that the philosopher of anti-theatricality formulates this ‘idea 
of the tragic’. In many ways, this makes sense, as it is Plato who is interested in the 
ethical impact of tragedy for the actors, for the audience and for the polis. Although 
Aristotle provides us with a formal, and, as some scholars claim, formalistic definition 
of tragedy,5 it is Plato who is more concerned with the political, ethical and to use his 
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own term, ‘muddy’ aspects of tragedy.6 This analysis hopes to show that it is not 
solely Platonic philosophy that conceptualises this ‘idea of the tragic’. Through The 
Bacchae the Greek stage itself presents us with both a poetics and a philosophy of the 
tragic; and an aesthetics of cruelty is possibly what helps to bridge these two 
somewhat disparate views of tragedy and the tragic.  
However, it would be unfair to the ‘German cast’ itself not to acknowledge a 
certain complexity beyond this split.  From Hölderlin onwards the return to the 
Greeks and specifically to tragedy was not a form of nostalgia, but as Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe claims, a quest ‘for the grounds of theatricality’.7 So this ‘idea of the 
tragic’ also engages the praxis of tragedy (Hölderlin’s mechane,8 Nietzsche’s revival 
of ritual and music; the list could theoretically encompass the whole of the modernist 
experiment in theatre). In turn this ‘idea of the tragic’ is heavily inflected by this 
revived theatricality.  
This conflation of the philosophies of tragedy with these performance 
imperatives, gives tragedy a heightened position in all the discussions about the 
relationships between politics and aesthetics, that I would claim form part of this 
‘German cast’. In all the debates from Nietzsche and Wagner to Brecht, Benjamin and 
Adorno, tragedy occupies a privileged position. Whether in Brecht’s somewhat 
schematic anti-Aritsolelianism – or more significantly in his revival of Hölderlin’s 
translation of the Antigone 9– or in Adorno’s championing of Beckett (and castigating 
of Brecht), the possibility or impossibility of tragedy is tested through its relationship 
to the political.   
In this sense, the choice of the Adorno quotation and his reflections on the 
relationships between horror, shudder and catharsis to frame this paper do not appear 
completely arbitrary. The theatrical tropes experimented with in The Bacchae and in 
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its long reception are consciously concerned with the possibility or not of catharsis, 
and with the modes of affect and spectatorship that tragedy proposes. The theatrical 
dimension of this quarrel, both ancient and modern, needs highlighting. From Plato 
onwards it is the embodied, civic, collective, i.e. specifically theatrical dimension of 
tragedy that appears troubling, that in many ways initiates the long durée of the anti-
theatrical tradition. Equally significant, however, is the fact that when the ‘ancient 
quarrel’, is revived by the moderns, as in the debates between Nietzsche and Wagner, 
or Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno, again the theatrical occupies a central position. This 
analysis puts forward the claim that the figure of Dionysus that enacts this fascination 
with the theatrical within modernity (as philosophical negativity and as embodied 
cruelty,) at least partly derives from this play and its reception. So, when Adorno 
claims that without ‘the shudder of catharsis’ there is nothing but reified 
consciousness, and that the proper response to art is horror, it is impossible not to also 
hear the reverberations of a Bacchic echo in his phrase. 
To return to the image of Agave that frames this paper, the modernists in 
many ways confront her provocation. The centrality of violence for this play and the 
ways it perhaps perverts the idea of sacrifice or even catharsis (is this the horror of the 
shudder or is it kitsch, as Adorno defined the ‘parody of catharsis?) proves attractive 
to the modernist theatrical and theoretical avant-garde. This analysis would like to 
propose a reading of the violence of Dionysus through Walter Benjamin’s notion of 
Divine Violence as this appears in his essay ‘Critique of Violence’,10 a violence that 
appears as a means without an end, not a recuperative / restorative violence, but a 
catastrophic violence that represents nothing other than ‘the sign of injustice in the 
world’. The tragic, both as a specific theatrical practice and as a body of philosophy, 
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might be one way in which this notion of Divine Violence is manifested and 
embodied as part of a theatrical event.  
 A summary of the play follows: Dionysus returns to Thebes from exile to 
prove that he is truly the son of Zeus. His lineage has been contested and he has been 
denied his rites, rituals and worship. He is here to set the record straight and to punish 
the Theban family that has dishonoured him and his mother, Semele. Dionysus comes 
with a chorus of followers, Asiatic slave women, the Bacchae, who call him their 
liberator. They are joined by the women of Thebes who respond to the call of the 
Bacchae and follow them and Dionysus in an ecstatic trance to the mountain, 
Cithearon, where they perform unspeakable acts. This all takes place while Pentheus, 
the king of Thebes and Dionysus’s maternal cousin – and his rival in this agon - is 
away. Cadmus and Tiresias, the blind prophet, as older, wiser men know better than to 
resist Dionysus and they decide to join in the rituals and appear dressed in Dionysiac 
paraphernalia. Upon seeing them Penthues is enraged and mocks them. As a man of 
reason and as a representative of state/secular power Pentheus is desperate to restore 
law and order in Thebes. Pentheus’s first encounter with Dionysus is erotically 
charged and this doubling of the two central roles continues throughout the play to 
reach its final apotheosis in the dressing up scene. Dionysus, tapping into Pentheus’s 
secret desire to watch the women on the mountain, convinces him to cross dress and 
after parading him through the streets of Thebes leads him to the mountain, where the 
hunter becomes the hunted, he is attacked by the Bacchae and finally torn to pieces by 
his own mother, who mistakes him for a wild beast. When Agave returns to Thebes 
with her prey on a thyrsus, she is gradually returned to consciousness with the help of 
her father. A horrible anagnorisis follows, where she eventually recongnises the face 
of her own son. At this point Dionysus appears in his own form, properly ex machina, 
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and hands out his own brand of justice. The family that dishonoured him is 
completely destroyed and banished from Thebes. Even Cadmus and his wife 
Harmonia who respected Dionysus’s rites are banished. Dionysus certainly gets his 
revenge, but has justice been served? 
It is this aspect of the play that opens it to somewhat ‘nihilist’ interpretations. 
And, indeed, the figure of Dionysus has been read as one of terror.11 The introduction 
of Benjamin’s notion of ‘Divine Violence’ could perhaps inflect this idea while also 
doing some justice to its theatrical manifestations. For Dionysus is certainly not a 
liberal; he does not seek equal representation and tolerance. His justice appears 
relentless and uneven. This is not the justice of The Oresteia, nor is it that of Antigone 
- plays whose discourses of vengeance, justice and law are also gendered.  This is not 
a matter of setting something right, of addressing cheques and balances.  How is the 
sacrifice of Pentheus and of the city of Thebes redeemed? How is its violence 
counterbalanced? Interestingly, as Derek Hughes claims in his Culture and Sacrifice, 
one of the crucial subordinate themes in the philosophical and anthropological 
readings of sacrifice is ‘the relationships between sacrifice and systems of calculation 
or measurement.’ He writes: 
[]… it becomes possible to see profound psychological or symbolic affinities 
between the quid pro quo of sacrificial transaction and the equivalences of 
established in systems of measurement, or in mathematical calculation, or in 
the determination of exchange value in the marketplace. 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
The use of counting in Greek tragedy is therefore analysed not because it is, in 
itself, sacrificial, but because it presents a constellation of ideas – the 
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relationship between man’s capacity for numerical order and moral chaos – 
which was later to explain his capacity for human sacrifice.12 
So, the violence and the sacrifice of The Bacchae is literally fruitless; it does not 
address an imbalance; it does not propose another system of measurement in its place. 
It is partly the function of the Greek term for fate, moira, which also etymologically 
means share, lot, percentage (and is linked to meros, part, and meirestha, to receive 
one’s share). So what is the ‘merit’ of this sacrifice, or who merits from this 
Dionysiac violence? The answer would have to be no one and nothing in the 
immediate present or in the strictly instrumental sense. This is violence in the 
Benjaminian sense as a ‘means without an end’, absolutely non-instrumental. It 
strikes, supposedly ‘out of blue’ and appears to be without rhyme or reason. Benjamin 
writes in his ‘Critique of Violence’: 
Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence is confronted by 
the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythical 
violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law destroying; if the former sets 
boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at 
once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, 
the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling 
blood… Mythical violence uses bloody power over mere life for its own sake, 
divine violence pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first 
demands sacrifice, the second accepts it.13 
As Žižek underlines in his comments on this passage, Divine Violence is not 
restorative, it is not law breaking followed by law making. It is simply ‘the sign of the 
injustice of the world, of the world being ethically out of joint’.14 It is the violence 
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that although systemically deriving from broader injustice  ‘appears’ arbitrary, wild 
and anarchic, i.e. the opposite of sovereign or liberal law. It is the violence that 
supposedly is based on pure trauma, on resentment (and not on politics proper). 
Sometimes we associate it with sudden violent outbursts of crowds (plythos is the 
term used in the play and not demos ) that offend our liberal or even our democratic 
sensibilities (let alone our property, our individual ‘freedom’, our ‘right’ to travel to 
work with the minimum of disruption, etc). Žižek mentions the examples of crowds of 
people in Rio de Janeiro who ‘descended from the favelas into the rich part of the city 
and started looting and burning supermarkets. This was divine violence… They were 
like biblical locusts, the divine punishment for men’s sinful ways.’ The recent riots in 
Athens itself (the city that in its ancient form prompted Euripides into exile) clearly 
show us that the middle classes too are capable of such violence (again in response to 
a settling of accounts, addressing a debt of sorts). It is not for nothing that the term for 
fate in classical Greek, moira, as mentioned above is linked with notions of 
measurement and, in the end, accounting itself, being accountable for one’s actions. 
And to quote Žižek again: ‘Those annihilated by divine violence are fully and 
completely guilty: they are not sacrificed, since they are not worthy of being 
sacrificed to and accepted by God – they are annihilated without being made a 
sacrifice’. 15 This is, more or less what happens at the end of this play. 
   The qualification of this violence as ‘Divine’ is, of course, significant, as for 
Benjamin the theological dimension (without which he claims revolution can never 
succeed) is crucial, as indeed it is for Greek tragedy in general and this tragedy in 
particular. Indeed, the relationship to the divine is one aspect of the play that makes it 
especially cruel. ‘It is not fitting that Gods should be like mortals in their rage’, 
contests Cadmus towards the end of the play. Yet, this God simply mirrors and 
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delivers the rage with which he was confronted (‘Yes, for I, a God, was treated with 
outrage by you’).16 However, because he is not a mere mortal his punishment does not 
need to fit the crime; it can be excessive, utterly cruel. Traditionally, this rendition of 
the divine by Euripides has been read as a critique of the Gods, as a sign of Euripides’ 
atheism. However, more recently classical scholars agree that far from being 
somewhat anachronistically an atheist, Euripides is deeply concerned with the 
function of the divine, and especially its structural link to the workings of tragedy. In 
her forthcoming study Tragically Speaking: On the Uses and Abuses of 
Poststructurlism for Life, Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, contends that The Bacchae ‘could 
be the founding play rehearsing “the separation of church and state”’.17 It could also 
be the founding play that rehearses the separation of the divine from the tragic (one of 
the reasons it has been interpreted as also staging the death of tragedy). In an 
insightful reading of the play that sees it as a series of parrhesiastic debates / clashes, 
where ‘truth-telling is also open not simply to being abused (as it is by Pentheus), but 
also to becoming the very agent of catastrophe (as Dionysus makes it be),18  she 
contends that Euripides stages the perils and possibilities of leading a ‘committed 
life’, a ‘parrhesiastic life’, and asks the demanding question: ‘And is parrhesia’s 
underside this terrible reality – that if one can die for what one believes, so one can 
kill for (not) believing?’.19 If this forms part of the ethics of tragedy, this ethics will 
always have a contingent relationship to the divine (the theological in Benjamin’s 
sense), even when, or especially when it is being critical of it. 
 If Dionysus embodies this type of Divine Violence, he also embodies the idea 
of theatre itself. His violence comes with a theatrical aesthetics, and that is one of 
cruelty. The connections between tragic form and the theatres of cruelty have been 
examined from modernism onwards, particularly through the work of Antonin Artaud, 
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but also Bertolt Brecht (although these two high priests of modernist theatricality are 
usually read in opposition). If the reception of this play by the philosophies of 
modernity from Nietzsche onwards allows us to read the figure of Dionysus as pure 
negativity, then its reception in performance has helped to create an aesthetic of 
cruelty for the stage. And this theatrical dimension is crucial, as the notions of cruelty 
are enacted through the embodied, civic and collective aspect of the tragic event.  
Žižek reads Benjamin’s Divine Violence as belonging to the order of the event rather 
than to the order of being: 
What this entails is that, to put it in Badiou’s terms, mythic violence belongs 
to the order of Being, while divine violence belongs to the order of Event: 
there are no ‘objective’ criteria enabling us to identify an act of violence as 
divine; the same act that, to an external observer, is merely an outburst of 
violence can be divine for those engaged in it – there is no big Other 
guaranteeing its divine nature, the risk of reading and assuming it as divine is 
fully the subject’s own.20 
And this contingent, ephemeral and embodied aspect of the Event is also the domain 
of the theatrical event. So Dionysus in one performance could be read as a terrorist 
and in another as a liberator – ideally in performances of the same production. The 
term Dionysus uses to describe Pentheus once he has dressed up as a woman, 
stressing the doubling and mirroring of their roles, is deinos (three times in two lines, 
971-2), a term he used earlier to describe himself  (in the superlative deinotatos, 861). 
This is a notorious term that has inspired much philosophical reflection.21 It can mean 
wondrous but also strange, able, astute but also horrific. Interestingly, it appears in the 
famous ‘Ode to man’ of the Antigone, and has been translated by Heidegger as 
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umheimliche. The play could be seen as enacting the deinon quality of tragic 
spectatorship itself, oscillating between humanist identification, catharsis as relief, 
purgation in the Aristotelian sense, and catharsis as a shudder, as estrangement in the 
Brechtian sense.   
  The play in many ways has helped to codify and conventionalise a set of 
theatrical tropes that we today can identify as an aesthetic of cruelty (hybridity, a 
confusion of binaries, cannibalism, meta-theatriclity, ecstasy, sacrifice, 
dismemberment etc). This is not an unmediated rite or ritual nor is it simply a 
philosophical essay. This is the Greek play that more than any other is directly 
concerned with the power of theatre itself, with notions of affect and spectatorship. 
For, as mentioned in the opening paragraph it does not dissolve into an orgy of 
emotion and sensation. In enacting the story of the return of Dionysus, it is also 
delineating in a clearly meta-theatrical manner the potential but also the danger that 
the tragic experience entails. This is the only extant play where Dionysus is the 
protagonist. Even though he was the God of theatre he was seldom visible on the 
Greek stage (perhaps the idea of embodying such a God triggered all the Platonic 
fears about contagion). It is fascinating to note that this tragedy enacting the birth of 
tragedy through Dionysiac ritual has come to stand in for the death of the genre itself. 
  This very theatricality of the play also morphs into its philosophy, into its 
‘truth claim’ as it were. And it is here where Greek tragedy itself is seen to be wearing 
a German mask. It has been claimed that Euripides is the first modern playwright; his 
championing of the underdog, his use of language, his meta-theatricality, together 
with the specific historical context of this particular play, a play of exile, have all 
made Euripides appealing to a modern sensibility and have contributed towards the 
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many revivals of The Bacchae towards the end of the twentieth century. However, the 
mark of modernity as it has been typified by the German cast of Greek tragedy (both 
in its idealist and its materialist manifestations – both Wagner and Brecht), is the 
ability to reflect, or the urge towards reflection. The Bacchae possibly offers us an 
example of how that reflection becomes a shudder. Through the embodied, sensual 
and civic experience of the tragic event and through an aesthetic of cruelty, The 
Bacchae theatricalises spectatorship and affect itself. The possibilities of the tragic 
experience (the dream of democracy, sexual revolution, the utopia of anarchy) but 
also the dangers (mob rule, chaos, absolute power, primitivism) are enacted and there 
possibly also lies its ‘truth claim’. For in a sense, this is the ultimate Platonic tragedy, 
enacting the Platonic dilemma regarding the power of the poetic / tragic; and we could 
read it in conjunction with the parable of the cave.   
 Classicists have pointed out that Plato writes like a tragic philosopher (in the 
way that Nietzsche ‘philosophises like a poet’). Indeed, legend has it that the young 
Plato wrote tragedies and later burnt them when he joined the academy.  This love 
/hate relationship with the tragic transpires in the rhetorical use of the dramatic 
dialogue, the creation of characters, and the sheer extent of his concern with and 
delineation of the agon between tragedy and philosophy (some may claim that Plato 
set the terms for that debate). More so than Aristotle, who in his defence of tragedy, 
focuses exclusively on its formal qualities, Plato is concerned with its philosophical 
efficacy. And his objection to tragedy is on the grounds of its ethics, of its ability to 
influence and shape both the actors and the audience. It is this aspect of Plato that at 
once initiates the great anti-theatrical tradition and, according to Stephen Halliwell, 
creates the ‘idea of the tragic’, at once Greek and German, both ancient and modern. 
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In this context, The Bacchae could be read as rehearsing that same agon 
between tragedy and philosophy, but through the discourses of theatre rather than 
philosophy. Those same discourses of the theatre are shown to be not simply formal 
matters, but endemic (in the demos) to both the aesthetics and ethics of tragedy. It is 
no surprise then that in all the modernist debates about the ideology of form and the 
efficacy of engaged or autonomous art the spectre of tragedy figures. What The 
Bacchae also shows us is that this philosophical tragedy (after all Aristotle deemed 
Euripides to be the most philosophical of all tragedians), is linked to an aesthetics of 
performance, one that can carry and help manifest notions of Divine Violence (in a 
genealogy of theatre that sees is at structurally linked to religion), primarily through a 
discourse of cruelty that permeates both the actors and the spectators. This is not 
catharsis as cleansing, justice or even retaliation; this is catharsis as the shudder. 
One of the premises that scholars cite in hailing Euripides as a modern 
playwright is the fact that this play was a work of exile. It was written in the court of 
Macedon where Euripides went in self-imposed exile. It was not commissioned as 
part of a dramatic festival and it was not written with the support of the whole 
machinery of Athenian democracy (a somewhat mythic combination that throughout 
the history of theatre has been read as the organic moment of the co-existance of 
theatre and democracy – part and parcel of the Classical moment). Indeed, it could be 
said that the play substitutes this ‘organic moment’ with the theatrical machine itself: 
Dionysus provides his own prologue, sets up the play and appears ex machina at the 
end to dish out his justice. It is as if the whole play is ex machina and Dionysus its 
master of ceremonies. 
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The play was produced posthumously by Euripides’ son in Athens at a time 
when Plato would have been about 19 years old (405 BCE). Continuing the many 
myths that surround the reception of this play, it be might interesting to speculate 
what would have happened had the young Plato (the Plato of the tragedies) witnessed 
this performance; might this horrific image of Dionysus have triggered some shudder 
in him; one that surfaced about 25 year later when in his repudiation of tragedy in The 
Republic he creates the notorious image of the rhapsode; one that will fold over into 
the image of the actor: 
If a man who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and 
imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself the poems 
which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy 
and wondrous and delightful creature, but should say to him that there is not 
man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to rise 
among us, and we should send him away to another city, after pouring myrrh 
down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool.22  
In a passage that has inspired much critical reflection,23 Plato, significantly, does not 
repudiate this stranger and his art; he does not call for his banishment. Rather, like 
Cadmus and Tiresias, he makes a plea for worship and appeasement. Note the use of 
the epithets, each coming with its own heavy philosophical resonance (deinos appears 
again). Furthermore, Plato is interested in the impact this visitor will have on the city 
for he presents a challenge to the order of things (‘nor is it lawful for such a man to 
rise among us’). Still there is no call for violence or sacrifice (for that is the domain of 
the tragic). Plato calls for a type of exorcism that would usher this shape-shifting 
stranger to another city. One wonders what this city would be that would welcome 
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such a creature. Thebes might present us with a case of a city that didn’t welcome the 
stranger or ‘covered him with myrrh’. The Bacchae also shows us that the other ‘city’ 
that can welcome this ‘cunning’ creature is the stage. 
 
Olga Taxidou 
11/8/2011       
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